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Evans: Evans: Lien of a Federal Judgement

THE LIEN OF A FEDERAL JUDGMENTt
OBaiN B. EvANs*
It's a poor choice between the frying pan and the fire. During the last
fourteen years Missouri lawyers have been able to advise their clients
with certainty that a judgment of a federal district court in lissouri
was a lien on the debtor's land in the county in which the judgment
was rendered from the time of rendition, for in Rhea v. Smith,' the United
States Supreme Court held ineffective the Missouri statute 2 purporting
to require registration of the judgment with the clerk of the state circuit
court. Subsequently, the statute was repealed. 3 As the price of their
knowledge, records of the federal court, frequently not kept in the county
where the judgment was rendered and the land was situated, must be
searched for the clients they advise, and the laymen who do not consult
them stumble unwittingly into one of the most deceptive snares of the law.
As to whether the lien extended to land in other counties in the federal
district or in the state without recording, every state purporting to provide
for and to regulate judgment liens by statute has been in the frying pan.
To be sure, in Rhea v. Smith there was specific dictum that the lien of the
federal judgment in Missouri was co-extensive with the district, but
6
dictum is not decision 5-and at any rate the present Missouri statute,
amended in 1935 in the legislative hope of complying with the mandates of
that opinion, has not been before the court. No phase of the law of any
other state has been considered by the Supreme- Court, which alone can
provide a formula for the necessary synthesis of state and federal statute.
The technique of Rhea v. Smith has been so difficult of rationalization that
it has furnished feeble light on any variation of the facts there involved.

tThis paper is adapted from one chapter of a dissertation submitted to the
faculty of the Yale Law School in April, 1940.
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Missouri. B.A., University of
Wisconsin, 1931, LL.B., 1935; J. S. D., Yale, 1940.
1. 274 U. S. 434 (1927).
2. Mo. REv. STAT. (1919) § 1554.
3.

Mo. Laws 1935, p. 207.

4. 274 U. S. at 444, 445.
5. In Rathbone Co. v. Kimball, 117 Neb. 229, 220 N. W. 244 (1928), the
dictum was flatly disregarded. Certiorariwas denied, 278 U. S. 655 (1929).
6. Mo. Laws 1935, p. 207.
(297)
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Not that the situation is unprecedented. In 1832 a judge of the
Supreme Court of Ohio observed, "The subject of the lien of judgments in
the United States courts has been looked upon by the profession as a
vexatious one. . .
The act of May, 1828,7 we do not think, with the
counsel for the plaintiff, removed all difficulties. "8 The court was quite
right; it did not.

I
Again and again we encounter the statement that judgment liens
exist only by virtue of statute and were unknown at common law. Seldom
challenged, the inaccuracy of the assertion was probably of little practical
consequence. It is true-so far as it is possible to be positive as to the
state of the law of England prior to 1285-that judgment liens as such were
not recognized in English law before that date, and that it was the enactment of a statute 9 in that year which marks the date. But even at common
law the King, by virtue of his royal prerogative, could subject the lands
of his debtor to payment of the debt and the lands were bound to satisfy
the debt from the time of its inception, though they came to the hands of a
bona fide purchaser." However, the private citizen could not ordinarily11
reach the land and the statute just referred to gave him that power. Though
the statute said nothing about a lien, the courts decided that because
judgment now gave a right to take the lands through an elegit there was a
lien from the moment that right arose. 2 The conclusion was logical, for
a lien upon certain property is really no more than a right to take the
property in satisfaction of a claim, but it was not inevitable. Both before
and after the statute of Westminster II a private citizen might take his
debtor's chattels by fi.fa. or lev.fa. with more certainty than under that

7. 4 STAT. 278 (1850).
8. Wright, J., in Lessee of Sellers v. Corwin, 5 Ohio 398, 402 (1832).
9. Reference is always made to the Statute of Westminister II (13 Edw.

I, c. 18), giving the right to a writ of elegit. In

the same year, however, the

statute of 13 Edw. I, c. 3 (de mercatoribus) provided for the satisfaction out of
the lands of the debtor of recognizances entered under the terms of the statute.
10. See Sir Gerrard Fleetwood's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 171a (K. B. 1611);

BACON's

ABRIDGMENTS,

Execution, p. 664 (Bouvier ed. 1868).

11. The exception seems to have been the case of an action of debt against
an heir upon the obligation of his ancestor. The reason, according to Bacon,

was that the chattels had passed to the executor or administrator and if the
creditor could not reach the land descended he could not reach the ancestor's

estate. BAcoN's ABRIDGMENTS, Execution, p. 664 (Bouvier ed. 1868). For a
discussion of the niceties of this exception, see Harbert's Case, 3 Co. Rep.
l1b (K. B. 1584), and notes in 76 Eng. Rep. 647.
12. See Audley v. Halsey, Cro. Car. 148 (K. B. 1792); Sir Gerrard Fleetwood's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 171a (K. B. 1611); Harbert's Case, 3 Co. Rep. llb

(K. B. 1584). BACON'S ABRIDGMENTS, Execution, p. 725 (Bouvier ed. 1868).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol6/iss3/3
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statute by elegit he could take his lands, 3 but it was never held that judgment gave a lien on the chattels. Instead, the lien on personal property
in favor of King or citizen dated at common law from the teste of the writ
under which they were taken, 14 and after 1676 only from the delivery
of the writ to the sheriff. 15 It is apparent there was an important step
between right of execution and judgment lien which the English judges had
to take on their own initiative, unsupported by statute, and although we
find in the books no discussion of the reasons for taking the step as t6 lands
and not as to chattels, speculation suggests considerations typical of common
law development. Perhaps the most persuasive is the repugnance of the
law to a separation of possession and title to personal property, a sentiment
existing to this day. Liens divorced from possession of movables are
potent sources of fraud to third persons, and while the courts did not
carry their principle to its logical conclusion, they at least eliminated the
creditor who slept on his judgment. One who sued out his writ would
shortly achieve possession in the normal course of execution.' The common
law rule was a compromise between logic and social interest, which
presently was considered to favor logic too much.
(I .
this created some inconveniency with respect to trade,
in making the goods still subject to execution, though in the hands of a
person who came by them for valuable consideration, and without notice
of any such execution; and as there was a farther inconveniency in making
a writ of execution taken out in vacation, to have relation to the last day
of the precedent term. . . . "7
Hence the statute previously referred
to, dating the lien on chattels from delivery of the writ to the sheriff."8
13. Even under an elegit the sheriff was not to "extend" the lands if there
were sufficient goods and chattels; he could never take all the lands, but only
one-half; the transfer was not absolute but only of possession until the debt
was paid.
14. Anonymous, Cro. Eliz. 174 (K. B. 1790); Boucher v. Wiseman, Cro.
Eliz. 440 (K. B. 1790); Parkes v. Mosse, Cro. Eliz. 181 (K. B. 1790); Sir
Gerrard Fleetwood's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 171a (K. B. 1611).
15. 29 Car. II, c. 3, § 16, ". . . that from and after the said four and
twentieth day of June no writ of fien facias, or other writ of execution, shall
bind the property of the goods against which such writ of execution is sued
forth, but from the time that such writ shall be delivered to the sheriff, undersheriff, or coroners, to be executed
"
16. It was subsequently held that any action on the part of the creditor
tending to delay prompt levy by the sheriff would forfeit the lien. Smallcomb
v. Buckingham, 1 Salk. 320 (K. B. 1795). This is still law where execution
liens otherwise date from before levy. Delay not only endangers purchasers
but tends to shield the debtor from other creditors. Wise v. Darby, 9 Mo. 131
(1845).
17. BACON'S ABRIDGMENTS, Execution, p. 728 (Bouvier ed. 1868).
18. The English Parliament was apparently willing to let the subsequent
purchasers carry the risk of something less than instantaneous levy. A number
of American legislatures seem to be in accord. A curious paradox persists in

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1941
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From very early times it was not the custom to deal with land solely
on the basis of possession. The concept of a nonpossessory interest in
land was no novelty in 1285. Moreover, an immovable could not be taken
from the jurisdiction of the court and the proximity of its records. But
one of the curious fictions of the common law-that all judgments were
supposed to be entered on the first day of the term in which they were
recovered-when applied to the new judgment liens upon real estate, could
and apparently did result in hardship to third persons, for in that same
statute of 29 Car. II, c. 3-which is better known as the Statute of Fraudsit was provided that the judge, or officer signing judgments, should set
down in writing the date of his signature and that the judgment should
bind the land as to bona fide purchasers only from that time."'
The English courts, as has frequently been observed, were notoriously
reluctant to institute procedural novelties of their own volition. In matters
of final process there may well be support in sound political theory for
this approach. Furthermore, the English Parliament tinkered with the
laws governing judicial activity with a restraint incomprehensible to
American nature. It was not until considerably after the independence
of the United States that a creditor might take all of his debtor's land, and
even then might not sell it in execution.20 But at an earlier date it had
been provided that English traders might seize colonial lands as chattels. 21
II
There was no provision under the Articles of Confederation for the
exercise of judicial power except in admiralty. The United States Constitution having corrected this omission and given to Congress power to
create and regulate federal trial courts, at the first session of Congress a
judicial code was enacted. A hastily drawn measure, it is not surprising

Missouri. Liens on chattels date only from actual levy of execution on judgments of the circuit courts (Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) §§ 1175, 1179) but from
delivery (except as to bona fide purchasers for value) of writs issued by justices
of the peace (Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 2319).
That the statute of 29 Car. II, c. 3, was designed to protect only bona fido
purchasers for value may be seen from an anonymous case reported in 2 Vent.
218 (K. B. 1726), where for this reason it was said that goods in the hands
of an heir were bound to satisfy a judgment against the ancestor on which a
fieri facias had been attested prior to but not delivered to the sheriff until after
the ancestor's death.
19. §§ 13, 14, 15. Entry in an alphabetical docket, or "dogget," was later
made a condition of a valid lien (445 W. & M. c. 20; 7 & 8 W. 3, c. 36) and

"registration" was required in Middlesex and Yorkshire (5 Ann. c. 18, § 4).
20. 1 & 2 Vict., c. 110 (1838).
21.

5 Geo. II, c. 7 (1732).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol6/iss3/3
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that it made no mention of such details as judgment liens. After all,
there was no legislative precedent to suggest the subject. Furthermore,
the labor saving (from a legislative standpoint) expedient of letting state
law-adjective as well as substantive-control the administration of federal
justice was well suited to the popular temper. On September 24, 1789,
what has come to be known as the Rules of Decision Act 2 2 was enacted in its
identical present form.2 3 On September 29, 1789, the first Process Act
became law. 24 By its terms it was to expire at the end of the next session
of Congress but with some modifications, it was then made permanent.2 5
We have only just witnessed an important change in this policy, in the
authorization and adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Specific legislation in regard to federal judgment liens was adopted fifty
years earlier-though still founded on a hope of federal and state conformity-but the chief problem today is so bound up with a concept
developed under the earlier statutes that it is essential to consider the
decision under them.
It was early held that by their authority federal judgment creditors
might reach land in the hands of subsequent purchasers from their debtors,
where by custom or statute state judgment creditors might do so.2 6 The
only uncertainty was whether it was a rule of substantive property law
or of practice, and under the two statutes the general question must be
decided the same way in either event. Finer points necessitated more
precise analysis.
22.

1 STAT. 92, c. 20, § 34 (1850).

23.

".

.

.

That the laws of the several states, except where the con-

stitution, treaties or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or
provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the
courts of the United States in cases where they apply." 28 U. S. C. § 725 (1935).
24. 1 STAT. 93, c. 21, § 2 (1850).
25. 1 STAT. 276, c. 36, § 2 (1850). Until the revision in 1828 it read:
. . . That until further provision shall be made, and except where by this
act or other statutes of the United States is otherwise provided, the forms of

writs and executions, except their style, and modes of process and rates of

fees, except fees to judges, in the circuit and district courts, in suits at common
law, shall be the same in each state respectively as are now used or allowed in
the supreme courts of the same. And the forms and modes of proceedings in
causes of equity, and of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, shall be according to the course of the civil law . . . subject, however, to such alterations

and additions as the said courts respectively shall, in their discretion, deem ex-

pedient, or to such regulations as the Supreme Court of the United States shall
think proper, from time to time, by rule, to prescribe to any circuit or district

court concerning the same.'

26. Tayloe v. Thomson's Lessees, 5 Pet. 358 (U. S.1831); Rankin & Schatzell v. Scott, 12 Wheat. 177 (U. S. 1827): see Lessee of Sellers v. Corwin, 5
Ohio 399 (1832). The first named case rested upon the state practice under the
statute of Geo. II, c. 7, held by the Maryland courts to extend in favor of all
creditors and create a lien upon the land, which practice was considered to be
law in force when the District of Columbia was ceded the federal government.

In the second case the right was said to depend upon the power, under the
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1941
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A. Duration of Lien
In Thompson v. Phillips,27 the Pennsylvania law requiring a scire facias

every seven years to preserve a judgment lien was held a rule of property
applicable to federal judgments and binding upon the federal courts. The
case was exhaustively argued by Sergeant, Todd, and Binney, and the
opinion displays much learning on the numerous problems of execution,
but it is submitted that Mr. Justice Baldwin's analysis was unsound.
The duration of the lien was a matter of federal law as truly as the mode of
proceedings leading to the judgment; being a matter of federal law, the
Rules of Decision Act was not applicable. It did not purport to require
the solution of federal problems by state law."
Whether the decision could be justified under the Process Act was also
uncertain. The result was clearly desirable, and in 1840, it was codified
by federal statute. 2 The most persistent problem under it has been, does
the state law limiting the duration of the judgment lien, then adopted,
apply to federal judgments in favor of the United States. The majority of
cases hold not.30 If we assume the general rule that statutes of limitations
state law, to reach the land under an elegit. The Ohio case was reconsidered in

Lessee of Corwin v. Benham, 2 Ohio St. 36 (1853) and disposed of upon other
grounds, but the earlier opinion was approved in Lawrence v. Belger, 31 Ohio

St. 175 (1877).

The Ohio lien statute, enacted subsequent to the passage of

the Process Act of 1891, had not been adopted by formal rule of federal court,
but its settled custom of conformity was considered equally effective. Fuller-

ton v. Bank of the United States, 1 Pet. 604 (U. S.. 1828).
27.

23 Fed. Cas. No. 13,974 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1830).

28. Of course, in drafting federal law Congress might take inspiration and

precedent from any source, and state law adopted by Congress for this purpose
becomes federal law. But Congress did not, in the Rules of Decision Act, intend
the same adoption that it did in the Process Acts. There is no reason to suppose it intended to forego all originality in legislating on federal matters. The
significant part of the statute here is the limitation of state laws to "cases
where they apply." If it be asked, "Why did Congress undertake to lay down
rules of decision on subjects not federal, as to which it could not constitutionally
direct the federal courts to apply a different rule and which they could not
constitutionally decide upon other than state law (witness Erie R. R. v. Tompkins)," perhaps the answer lies in an uneasy concern over just such waywardness
in federal judges as was demonstrated in the near century following Swift v.
Tyson.
It must be acknowledged that in a number of cases the United States Supreme Court has talked as though the Rules of Decision Act controlled. The
language of the cases there, and in other tribunals, is so equivocal that it is
not practical to classify them as adopting one theory or another. Ward v.
Chamberlain, 2 Black 430 (U. S. 1862), is one of many illustrating this statement.
29. ". . . Judgments and decrees hereafter rendered in the circuit and
district courts of the United States, within any State, shall cease to be liens on
real estate or chattels real in the same manner and at like periods as judgments
and decrees of the courts of such State now cease by laws to be liens thereon;
and the respective clerks of the United States courts in such State shall receive
the like fees for making searches and certificates respecting such liens as are
now allowed for like services to the clerks of the supreme court of such
State . . ." 5 STAT. c. 44, § 4 (1850), 28 U. S. C., § 814 (1934).
30. United States v. Houston, 48 Fed. 207 (D. Kan. 1891); United
States v. Kendall, 263 Fed. 126 (E. D. La. 1920); United States v. Minor,

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol6/iss3/3
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do not run against the government to be well founded,3 1 there seems no
sufficient reason why the public should be prejudiced by the failure of
its representative to levy execution but not by their delay in prosecuting
the action originally.12 The argument advanced by the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit 3-that the New York statute was not one
of limitation but of affirmative grant of power to issue execution for five
years, etc.-makes a distinction without a difference.
It has also been questioned whether the above statute adopted state
law authorizing judges, in their discretion, to suspend the operation of the
lien pending appeal, the defendant having given bond. In Myers v. Tyson,3 '
it was held not, because the federal act applied only where the liens cease
"by law," not where they are suspended by order of the court exercising
a discretion not vested in federal judges. However, in United States v.
Sturgis, 5 it was thought that the federal statute adopting "the forms and
modes of process" of the state court authorized the use of this practice
in the federal courts; that inasmuch as the lien depended upon the adoption
of the state law, the law must have been taken with all the modifications
and characteristics pertaining thereto.3 6
B. TerritorialLimitations
In Manhattan Co. v. Evertson,37 a judgment had been rendered in the
United States Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York against
a debtor owning lands in the Northern and Southern Districts. It was held
that the judgment was a lien upon all the lands which might be reached
by execution of the court (in other words, upon all the land of the debtor
in the state) 38 and was not confined to the territorial jurisdiction to which
its original process extended (that is, the district for which it sat). The
235 Fed. 101 (C. C. A. 4th, 1916). Cf. United States v. Noojin, 155 Fed. 377
(S. D. Ala. 1907). Contra: United States v. Harpootlian, 24 F. (2d) 646 (C.

C. A. 2d, 1928); Payette v. Marshall County, 180 Iowa 660, 163 N. W. 592
(1917).

Cf. Custer v. McCutcheon,

41 F. (2d) 354 (C. C. A. 9th, 1930)

(suggesting a distinction between a time limit on issuance of execution and on

the duration of the lien, and holding that as to the former at least the statute
would not run against the government).

31.

Cases are collected in Note, L. R. A. 1916 E, 96, and earlier notes.

32.
33.

Custer v. McCutcheon, 41 F. (2d) 354 (C. C. A. 9th, 1930).
United States v. Harpootlian, 24 F. (2d) 646 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928).

35.

14 Fed. 810 (S.D. N. Y. 1883).

34.

17 Fed. Cas. No. 9,995 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1876).

36. The 1828 amendment to the Process Act had provided that where the

defendant, by state law, was entitled to an imparlance of the lien for one or
more terms, he should be entitled to an imparlance of one term in the federal
court. 4 STAT. 278, c. 68 (1850).

37. 6 Paige 457 (N. Y. Ch. 1837).
38.

Act of May 20, 1826, c. 124; 4

STAT.

184; 28 U. S. C. § 838 (1928).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1941
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court observed that in pre-revolutionary days the statute39 giving the right
to reach the land upon execution was considered to give a lien as extensive
as the possibility of execution, which in the supreme court was state-wide.
This right to take the land was continued by statute.40 In view of the
weight later given to those factors it is unfortunate the court did not
elaborate upon the character of jurisdiction exercised by the several state
courts as compared to the circuit courts of the United States, their respective
territorial jurisdiction, and the extent of process from each. It was apparently not considered important."1
More difficult is the problem where the state by statute has limited
specifically the territorial scope of the liens of state judgments. Conceivably such limitation might be absolute, but in fact wherever it has
been imposed, it has been conditional. The first case42 was decided in
1840 and has influenced the course of decisions ever since.
In Indiana, judgments of the state courts had always been considered
a lien on real estate by virtue of statutes subjecting such property to
execution. In 1818, statute specifically recognized the lien, which was
apparently co-extensive with the territory to which final process might
be directed. In 1824, 3 it was laid down that judgments of the state.
circuit courts should be liens from rendition on land in the county where
rendered, but in other counties only from recording of the judgment with
the clerks thereof. On December 5, 1837, judgment was rendered against
Candler in the United States Circuit Court for the District of Indiana.
It does not appear where the court sat at the time other than that it was
39. 5 Geo. II, c. 7 (1732).
40. Act of March 17, 1787; 1 Greenl. Laws 407.
41. A consideration which did concern the court was the law by which
judgments in favor of the United States may be enforced anywhere within the
United States. Did such judgments give nation-wide liens? The court concluded that there could be no state law giving a lien outside its territory to be
adopted by the federal courts; that this was, therefore, not such a logical consequence of the principle of the instant case that its social undesirability should
militate against the holding here.
In accord, Prevost v. Gorrell, 19 Fed. Cas. No. 11,400 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1877).
But see Lombard v. Bayard, 15 Fed. Cas. No. 8,469 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1848);
Rhea v. Smith, 274 U. S. 434 (1927). Cf. Dermott v. Carter, 109 Mo. 21, 18
S. W. 1121 (1892). The numerous cases holding that in adopting the state
lien law the territorial jurisdiction of the federal district and circuit courts was
to be approximated to county-wide original jurisdiction of the state courts
would also seem opposed. See note 53, infra. The language of many of the
courts, where the issue was not before them, is very confusing. So, in United
States v. Scott, 27 Fed. Cas. No. 16,242 (C. C. W. D. Tex. 1878), the court said,
"The judgment of a federal court is a lien upon all lands in the district and
within reach of its process." It is very common to encounter the statement
that the lien was co-extensive with "the territorial jurisdiction" of the federal
court, certainly an ambiguous phrase.
42. Shrew v. Jones, 22 Fed. Cas. No. 12,818 (C. C. D. Ind. 1840).
43. Act of January 30, 1824.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol6/iss3/3
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not in Cass County. The judgment was never recorded in any county
clerk's office. On February 26, 1838, a judgment was rendered in the
state circuit court in Cass County, where the land in question lay. The
purchaser from the marshal, levying and selling under the federal judgment, then brought ejectment in the federal court against the purchaser
from the sheriff who under the state judgment had first levied upon the land.
In holding for the plaintiff, Mr. Justice McLean argued three propositions. The first, on which chief reliance was placed, proceeded on the
assumption that the state supreme court's judgments were, in 1828, liens
throughout the state (an unsettled but reasonable contention), that subsequent limitation of the territorial scope of that lien (by statute in 1831)
was irrelevant in view of the adoption as federal law in 1828 of only the
"forms and modes of proceeding . . . now used in the highest court
of original and general jurisdiction of the same,"4 and that the lien of the
federal circuit court judgment in 1837 was, therefore, state-wide without
further recording.
A skeptical reader might ask a number of questions about this approach. Granting that the federal judgments were liens because the federal
government had adopted state process, not because they had adopted
state laws as rules of decision, the Process Act of 1828 made a clear
distinction between mesne process and modes of proceedings, on the one
hand, and final process and writs of execution on the other. It is the latter
section, if any, which adopts state lien law, but it is only the former which
refers to the "highest court" of the state. But even if we suppose the
Act throughout meant to adopt the process, final as well as mesne, of the
"highest court," note that that court is further identified as the "highest
court, of original and general jurisdictioin." The Supreme Court of
Indiana was not a court of original and general jurisdiction; in most
instances its jurisdiction was appellate. Such analogy between the -state
supreme court and the federal circuit court was the basis of the Missouri
statute later condemned in Rhea v. Smith.
The learned Justice's second argument, less favored by himself, has
proved to be the more enduring. In his own words, it runs:
If the rules of proceeding by the circuit courts of the state
be followed by this court, effect is given to them without reference to the
limited jurisdiction of these courts. The limits of the state, in the exercise
of the jurisdiction of this court, is as the limits of a county to the local

44. 4

STAT.

278, c. 68 (1850).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1941
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court. The modes of judicial proceedings and rules of property are
different in the different states; and, in adopting those rules, congress
designed, as far as practicable, to give the same effect to them in the courts
of the Union as in the courts of the state. . . . But if a state law,
being framed in reference to the limited jurisdiction of the state courts,
for this reason can not constitute a rule for the federal courts, the legislation of congress, on the subject, has been in vain. Such has not been
the view taken by the courts of the United States. The law of the state
regulates the proceedings of a sheriff on execution. He is to advertise the
property, real or personal, &c., but his duties are all limited to the county.
The same rule governs the marshal, and operates throughout the state.
The principles of the state law are adopted, but the instruments which
give effect to those principles are necessarily different, and they are made
to operate throughout a more extended jurisdiction."
It may be observed that the federal statute spoke only of process, not
of lien. A lien is not final process itself, not a form of writ of execution.
Certainly it is not mesne process nor a "form of proceeding" (a phrase
construed in Wayman v. Southard" not to include judicial activity after
judgment). It is a consequence of the judicial power over the person and
property of the litigants before the court. Though the right of a successful
litigant to satisfy his judgment out of property in the hands of a third
party, to which property his adversary had title when the judgment was
rendered, may perhaps be a substantive one, the fact that it flows from
this aspect of federal sovereignty prevents that right from being a case
where the laws of the several states apply, within the Rules of Decision
Act.
This would seem to leave two alternatives. Congress had adopted
as federal law the forms of final process and writs of execution of the state.
These may include an elegit, fieri facias, levari facias, and others. If final
execution could be levied upon the land to satisfy judgments of the state
courts, federal execution could also be levied upon the land. The federal
court might then take, on its own initiative,4 the step taken by the English
courts after the enactment of the Statute of Westminster II, holding the
point ungoverned by statute but determining on common law principles
that the right to execution gave a lien. On reason and precedent such lien
should be co-extensive with the right to execution, which was state-wide.
State recording requirements would not be applicable.
45.
46.

10 Wheat. 1 (U. S. 1825).
But see Ward v. Chamberlain, 2 Black 430 (U. S. 1862).
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There being but one federal district in Indiana, the problem of Manhattan Co. v. Evertson did not arise, but the analysis just suggested would
uphold that decision. However, in case execution on a state court judgment was not state-wide, in determining the territorial scope of federal
execution under the Process Act, the court would still be confronted with
the question of whether the "mode or final process" was adopted literally
or in form adopted to the territorial organization of the federal courts.
The other alternative-and the rationale evidently though not expressly adopted by the court (and by federal courts ever since)-was that
Congress by the Process Act intended to provide for and regulate all
exercise of power by the federal courts in enforcing their judgment, whether
or not the language employed was adequate for the purpose. Hence,
the question of judgment liens was referable to that statute. And that
statute might be freely construed to permit- adaptation of the state law
which in terms it purports to adopt literally. The necessity for that
cavalier treatment of Congressional language may be stated as Justice
McClean's third argument in favor of the decision.
The point is a practical one. If recording of the judgment were a
condition precedent to a lien in counties other than that in which the judgment is rendered, the federal judgments would be liens of much less scope
than the state court judgments. The federal courts did not sit in every
county, -there were no federal recording offices, the state recording officers
were under no obligation, indeed had no authority to record the federal
judgments.
Subsequent writers have generally assumed, as the court here stated,
that state recording officers are under no obligation and could not be
required to give equal treatment to transcripts of federal judgments. The
proposition is not beyond question, however. 'Whether the state government
had intended to impose a duty upon its officers to record federal judgments
was a matter for the state courts to decide, but the federal courts might
reasonably hold that the state could not discriminate against the federal
government. Granting this, it does not follow as the night the day that
the state recording requirements were not to be imposed upon federal judgments.471 It is at least plausible to insist that the state recording officers
had to record the federal judgments, whether they would or no. Our

47. When, in Metcalf v. Watertown, 153 U. S. 671 (1894), the Supreme
Court held that a state might not impose a shorter statute of limitations for
suits upon federal judgments than upon state judgments, it did not hold that
the statute for state judgments was not applicable to federal judgments.
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problem is whether Congress by the Process Act adopted the recording
limitations of the state judgment liens along with the rest of the state lien
law thought to be within the scope of the Process Act. It is not a complete
answer that it did not because the state recording officers might not record
federal judgments. If Congress did adopt the recording requirements, they
perhaps could be made to. It could be considered a Congressional mandate
to the state clerks to so act. Analogy is not wanting. Naturalization of
aliens, for example, is a matter of exclusive federal control,4 but Congress
has vested state courts of record as well as federal courts with jurisdiction
of naturalization proceedings pursuant to the rules it has established, 4 and
it has imposed definite duties upon the clerks of those courts. 0 Vigorous
objection has been made to the Congressional delegation of authority, but
the practice has long been sustained.5 '
Moreover, the result of the instant case is not equality. So far as the
district is concerned, federal judgments are in a position superior to those
of the state. But if there are several districts in the state, by the very
premise of the argument they may not be recorded so as to perfect the
52
lien in any district but that of rendition.
The opinion concludes with this pregnant observation:
"If it shall be deemed important to have the records of the judgments
of this court recorded in the county where the lands of the defendant
are situated, it may be required by act of congress, or by a rule of this
court, if the law of the state shall require the clerks to make such record."
Shrew v. Jones has been generally followed, though not without
dissent.3 In Massingifl v. Downs,5 4 Mr. Justice McLean, this time speaking
U. S. CONSTITUTION, Art. I, § 8.
49. 8 U. S. C. § 357 (1934).
50. 8 U. S. C. § 400 (1934).
51. Levin v. United States, 128 Fed. (C. C. A. 8th, 1904).

48.

See Barnett,

Delegation of Federal Jurisdiction to State Courts by Congress (1909) 43 AM.

L. REV. 259.
52. Professor Glenn has suggested that it would be possible to record a
transcript of the judgment with the clerks of the federal district courts for
the other districts, by each recording creating a lien throughout the particular

district.
§ 23.

GLENN, FRAUDULENT

CONVEYANCES

AND

PREFERENCES

(2d ed. 1940)

This solution has never been adopted by any court and would seem to

strain the "adaptation" of the state recording system to the breaking point.

53. In accord with that decision, Ludlow v. Clinton Line R. R., 15 Fed. Cas.
No. 8,600 (C. C. N. D. Ohio 1861); Carroll v. Watkins, 5 Fed. Cas. No. 2,457
(D. C. S. D. Miss. 1870); United States v. Humphreys, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,422
(C. C. E. D. Va. 1879); Byers v. Fowler, 12 Ark. 218 (1851); Trapnall v.

Richardson, 13 Ark. 543 (1853); Rock Island Nat. Bank v. Thompson, 173 Ill.
593, 50 N. E. 1089 (1898); In re McGill, 6 Pa. 504 (1847); Branch v. Lowery,
31 Texas 96 (1868); Commercial Bank v. Eastern Banking Co., 51 Neb. 766, 71

N. W. 1024 (1897); see Massingill v. Downs, 7 How. 760 (U. S. 1848); Ward
(Continued on next page.)

54. 7 How. 760 (U. S. 1848).
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for the Supreme Court, reiterated the second, argument of his earlier
opinion. The latter case is generally considered to have settled the law
of federal judgment liens prior to 1888, but it may be noted that the decision really concerned only the question of the applicability of a state
recording statute to a federal judgment rendered prior to its enactment.
An historically amusing situation developed in Mississippi, where
Massingill v. Downs arose, the state courts persisting in their view that the
federal judgment was no lien unless "enrolled," '55 the federal courts
following the Supreme Court decision."' It would seem that the several
state court decisions might have gone to the United States Supreme Court,
which, consistent with its view that a federal judgment lien is a direct
consequence of a federal statute (albeit some uncertainty as to which one),
has invariably held that such decisions are reviewable as denying a right
claimed under a statute of the United States.5 7 On principle it would seem
undeniable that the federal courts should determine the question, whether
their views were sound or not. The persistence of the state court in the
earlier decisions may well reflect the spirit of the confederacy. If the
United States court had reviewed those decisions, a reversal might not
have been respected. But the decision in 1882 is an anachronism.
The several federal statutes enacted prior to 1888 seem not to have
affected the decisions at all. The Act of 1840 was concerned solely with
the duration and termination of the lien,58 although cited on this problem
by a number of courts.59 The Conformity Act of 1872 spoke with greater
55.

Tarpley v. Hamer, 9 Smedes & M. 310 (Miss. 1848); Bonaffee v. Fisk,

13 Smedes & M. 682 (Miss. 1850); Brown & Johnston v. Bacon, 27 Miss. 589

(1854) ; Hall v. Green, 60 Miss. 47 (1882). And see Miss. CoDE (1857) 525, arts.
262, 263.
56. Carroll v. Watkins, 5 Fed. Cas. No. 2,457 (D. C. S. D. Miss. 1870).
57. Clements v. Berry, 11 How. 398 (U. S. 1850); Cooke v. Avdry, 147
U. S. 375 (1893); Rhea v. Smith, 274 U. S. 434 (1927).
58. Cropsey v. Crandall, 6 Fed. Cas. No. 3,418 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1850).
59. Notably Cooke v. Avery, 147 U. S.375 (1893); United States v. Kendall,
236 Fed. 126 (D. C. E. D. La. 1920); Dermott v. Carter, 109 Mo. 21, 18 S. W.
1121 (1892).
(53-Continued)
v. Chamberlain, 2 Black 430 (U. S.1862); Rhea v. Smith, 274 U. S.434 (1927);
Lombard v. Bayard, 15 Fed. Cas. No. 8,469 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1848); Cropsey
v. Crandall, 6 Fed. Cas. No. 3,418 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1851); Barth v. Makeever,
4 Biss. 206 (C. C. D. Ind. 1868); United States v. Scott, 27 Fed. Cas. No. 16,242
(C. C. W. D. Tex. 1878); Dermott v. Carter, 109 Mo. 21, 18 S.W. 1121 (1891).
Contra: Reid v. House, 2 Humph. 576 (Tenn. 1841) (arguing that the state
recording requirement was not based upon jurisdiction of the courts but upon
convenience in providing public records of title to lands); Vance's Heirs v.
Johnson, 10 Humph. 214 (Tenn. 1849); Alsop v. Mosely, 104 N. C. 60, 10 S. E.
124 (1889); Tarpley v. Hamer, 9 Smedes & M. 310 (Miss. 1848); Brown &

Johnston v. Bacon, 27 Miss. 589 (1854); Hall v. Green, 60 Miss. 47 (1882).
See United States v. Kendall, 263 Fed. 126 (D. C. La. 1920).
tional Bank v. Clark, 55 Kan. 219, 40 Pac. 270 (1895).
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clarity of the extent of final process from the federal courts, 0 and whatever
doubt may have existed as to whether a statute adopting the "writs of
execution and other final process" of the state inevitably adopted its judgment lien law, there is no room for argument under this law. Couched in
terms of the rights of the judgment creditor, it clearly provides that if by
state law, and to satisfy a state court judgment, he could reach property
transferred by his debtor to a third person, he can also do so to satisfy his
federal judgment. One might suppose that if there were any limitations
or conditions on the right to pursue that land in the hands of a third
party to satisfy the state judgment, those conditions would limit the
remedies on the federal judgment. Nor is this denied by the decisions
which, after 1872 as before, held that a federal judgment was a lien upon
rendition throughout the district of the court (embracing several counties)
whenever the state judgment was a lien throughout the county (but not
elsewhere unless recorded).61 These cases argue that the state court judgment is a lien upon rendition primarily throughout the jurisdiction of the
court; that when the state statute said "county," it meant the jurisdiction
of the state trial court, which was county-wide. The adaptation of the
statute to the federal districts did not, in their eyes, strip any conditions
or limitations; it but adopted, in accordance with Congressional mandate,
the true statute.
Of course, state legislators could have said "jurisdiction," if they
had meant to emphasize that aspect of the case and to minimize the fact
that counties are the established units for recording purposes of all kinds,
whether co-terminous with court jurisdiction or not. A number of state
courts have rejected the doctrine of Shrew v. Jones, Massingill v. Downs,
and related cases, and, presumably, the rationalization upon which they
60. "That in common-law causes in the circuit and district courts of the
United States the plaintiff shall be entitled to similar remedies, by attachment
or other process against the property of the defendant, which are now provided
for by the laws of the State in which such court is held, applicable to the
courts of such State; and such circuit or district courts may, from time to
time, by general rules, adopt such State laws as may be in force in the State
in relation to attachments and other process; and the party recovering judgment
in such cause shall be entitled to similar remedies upon the same, by execution
or otherwise, to reach the property of the judgment debtor, as are now provided by the laws of the State within which said circuit or district courts shall
be held in like causes, or which shall be adopted by rules as aforesaid: Provided, That similar preliminary affidavits or proofs, and similar security as
required by such laws, shall be first furnished by the party seeking such attachment or other remedy." 17 STAT. 196, c. 255, § 6 (1873), 28 U. S. C. § 726 (1934).
61. United States v. Humphreys, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,422 (C. C. E. D. Va.
1879); Rock Island Nat. Bank v. Thompson, 173 Ill. 593, 50 N. E. 1089 (1898);
Commercial Bank v. Eastern Banking Co., 51 Neb. 766, 71 N. W. 1024 (1897).
See Rhea v. Smith, 274 U. S. 434 (1927); United States v. Scott, 27 Fed. Cas.
No. 16,242 (C. C. W. D. Tex. 1878). Cf. Cooke v. Avery, 147 U. S. 375 (1893).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol6/iss3/3
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are based. Granted that the power of the federal courts over the persons
and property of litigants is a matter for federal determination, which the
state courts may not conclude, Congress had disposed of the question by
adopting the state law on state judgments. It was for the federal courts to
determine whether Congress meant what it said; to twist Congressional
language as they deemed necessary; but if Congress did mean to adopt
literally the state rule, it was for the state courts to determine what that
was. A clear assertion by the highest state court that the state recording
requirements for judgment liens were part of its system of public records,
based upon counties as the administrative unit of all recording acts and
not at all upon the jurisdiction of the courts rendering the judgment,
would preclude any argument that in holding a federal judgment a lien
throughout the district the federal court was but adopting the true
essence of the state law.
There would undoubtedly be the argument that to recognize a lien
in counties other than where rendered only after registration would
prejudice federal judgments, for there were (and are) not federal recording agencies in every county, and state officers need not, perhaps may not,
record federal judgments. It has already been pointed out that this begs
the question. Moreover, even though valid in other respects this argument
amounts to saying not only that Congress did not foresee this difficulty and
did not mean what it said in the Process Acts, but further that if Congress
had foreseen and properly considered this difficulty, it would have spoken
to the effect of Shrew v. Jones. In the second place, state mandate to state
officers that they should register federal judgments equally with state
judgments did not affect the decisions of the federal courts of those states
62
as to the territorial extent of federal judgment liens.
'Where the state law requires the registration of the state judgment
with a state officer unconnected with the courts, there is small room for
the argument that the judgment is, upon rendition, a lien throughout
the "jurisdiction" of the court rendering it. This was the law in only
one reported case63 and its significance was not considered there, but it
62. This was the law when Carroll v. Watkins, 5 Fed. Cas. No. 2,457

(D. C. S. D. Miss. 1870) was decided. See text at note 56, supra. It was also
the law which the court in Cooke v. Avery, 147 U. S. 375 (1893) refused to

pass on.
63. United States v. Kendall, 263 Fed. 126 (D. C. E. D. La. 1920), where
the court, on the altogether inadequate authority of Cooke v. Avery, 147 U. S.
375 (1893), said that the federal judgment was not, prior to 1888, a lien in
Louisiana in the parish of rendition without further recording. However, there
was no citation of Massingill v. Downs or the other cases finding an extended

lien, no discussion of the principles for which they stand, no attempt to disPublished by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1941
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is,improbable that the federal courts would interpret the Process Act
to require the state recording of federal judgments as a condition of lien.
64
As Judge Hughes observed in another case,
it may be laid down as a rule having few exceptions that in
any case of a law of a state conferring rights upon conditions, or with
exceptions, and adopted by congress as operative in that state, wherever the
exceptions or conditions depend upon the action of state officers, so that
the enjoyment of rights thus once conferred could be defeated or divested
by the action, or refusal to act, of a state officer, such a condition, or
exception, in the state law is uniformly held by the United States courts
not to limit the rights conferred by the act of congress adopting the state
law."y
If this was the real reason for disregarding the recording requirements, why limit the lien to the district of the court? It would be more
logical to hold it co-extensive with the power of execution in all cases.",

tinguish them on the basis of this difference in statute. Moreover, the statement, while considered and positive, was not necessary to the decision of the
case, which is discussed infra in note 70. Whether one approves or disagrees
of the statement, the case is hardly authority on this point.
64. United States v. Humphreys, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,422 (C. C. E. D. Va.
1879).
65. The rationalization of these early cases is still of practical significance.
As will be seen, it has been employed in interpretation of the Act of 1888. And
where that Act does not apply, the Process Act of 1872 is still in force and the
early cases are still law, except as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4f may
have increased the "territorial jurisdiction"--whatever that phrase means-to
the state borders.
The law of federal attachments (highly important in the New England
states, where attachment process rather than judgment lien is relied upon to
protect the creditor) and of lis pendens is not affected by the Act of 1888. The
rationalization of "lien throughout the jurisdiction," if valid at all, is quite as
applicable to "attachment effective throughout the jurisdiction" or "notice
throughout the jurisdiction." There is a considerable body of authority on the
lis pendens problem, and it is nicely divided. That the state recording requirements effectively limit the doctrine of lispendens as applied to federal actions:
United States v. Calcasien Timber Co., 236 Fed. 196 (C. C. A. 5th, 1916) (the
state statute purported to apply to federal suits and to authorize recording
by state officers); United States v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 172 Fed. 271
(C. C. D. Minn. 1909) ; see Jones v. Smith, 40 Fed. 314 (C. C. E. D. N. Y. 1889) ;
Tennis Coal Co. v. Sacket, 172 Ky. 729, 190 S. W. 130 (1916). Contra: Rutherglen v. Wolf, Fed. Cas. No. 12,175 (C. C. E. D. Va. 1876); McClaskey v. Barr,
48 Fed. 130 (C. C. S. D. Ohio 1891); King v. Davis, 137 Fed. 222 (C. C. W. D.
Va. 1905), aff. sub nom., Blankenship v. King, 157 Fed. 676 (C. C. A. 4th, 1906);
United States v. Olzak, 6 F. (2d) 1014 (D. C. N. J. 1925); Majors v. Cowell,
51 Cal. 478 (1876); Wilson v. Heflin, 81 Ind. 35 (1881); Stewart v. Wheeling

& Lake Erie Ry., 53 Ohio St. 151, 41 N. E. 247 (1895).

The basic split of

opinion seems to have been over whether the recording law was a rule of

property. It may be observed that the Advisory Committee drafting the Rules
of Civil Procedure were of the opinion that it was a rule of substantive law,
citing United States v. Calcasien Timber Co. See the Committee's note to Rule
64..
It is submitted that the Committee was quite right in refraining from
drafting a rule on lis pendens, but that the question is not one of substantive

property law. It is a problem of the inherent power of the court to protect
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol6/iss3/3
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It took forty-eight years6" for Congress to accept Mr. Justice McLean's
adivice.67 On August 1, 1888, Congress enacted the following statute :68
"That judgments and decrees rendered in a circuit or district court of
the United States within any State, shall be liens on property throughout
such State in the same manner and to the same extent and under the same
conditions only as if such judgments and decrees had been rendered by
a court of general jurisdiction of such State: Provided, That whenever
the laws of any State require a judgment or decree of a State court to be
registered, recorded, docketed, indexed, or any other thing to be done,
in a particular manner, or in a certain office or county, or parish in the
State of Louisiana before a lien shall attach, this act shall be applicable
therein whenever and only whenever the laws of such State shall authorize
the judgments and decrees of the United States courts to be registered,
recorded, docketed, indexed, or otherwise conformed to the rules and requirements relating to the judgments and decrees of the courts of the State.
"SEc. 2. That the clerks of the several courts of the United States shall
prepare and keep in their respective offices complete and convenient indices
and cross-indices of the judgment records of said courts, and such indices
and records shall at all times be open to the inspection and examination of
the public.
"SE. 3. Nothing herein shall be construed to require the docketing of
a judgment or decree of a United States court, or the filing of a transcript
thereof, in any State office within the same county or parish in the State
of Louisiana in which the judgment or decree is rendered, in order that
such judgment or decree may be a lien on any property within such
county. ")

The third section was amended in 18959 ,by the insertion of the words
its dignity and effectuate its decrees. Recording does not so much furnish
notice so that the plaintiff may prevail against subsequent encumbrancers or
grantees as it ameliorates the danger of hardship to innocent parties in the
course of the court's protection of its proceedings. While I firmly believe in
the desirability of compliance with the state recording system, the present
state of the decisions would seem to necessitate a federal statute.
66. Unsuccessful attempts had been made during the forty-eighth and fortyninth Congresses. Four similar bills were pending before the House of Representatives when, as a substitute measure, the Judiciary Committee introduced
the original bill which,.with amendments, ultimately was enacted. See 19 CoNG.
REc. 2359 et seq. (50th Congress, 1st sess., 1888).
67. Proffered in Shrew v. Jones, 22 Fed. Cas. No. 12,818 (C. C. D. Ind.
1840), and quoted supra at p. 308.
68. 25 STAT. 357, c. 729 (1888), 28 U. S. C. § 812 (1934).
69. Act of March 2, 1895, 28 STAT. 813, c. 180 (1895).
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"the same" between "or" and "parish" of the original statute, and by
the addition of the condition,
if the clerk of the United States court be required by law
to have a permanent office and a judgment record open at all times for
public inspection in such county or parish."
This third section was then stricken from the statute altogether 0 and
the first two sections enacted in 1888 now stand, with the Act of 1840,
as the entire federal legislation specifically concerned with the subject
of judgment liens. It is, of course, apparent that the Act of 1888 is only
conditionally applicable. If the conditions are not met, the Process Acts
and the interpretation discussed in the preceding section govern.
A.

The Proviso of the Federal Act

The biggest problem of federal judgment liens is and always has been
the effect of state recording statutes. Although mention is made of it only
in the proviso, the whole purpose of the statute is to solve that problem.
Hence it is the proviso which is the important clause. Where the state lien
law includes recording provisions, the state law is adopted by the first
clause of the act only71 when "the laws of such State

.

.

.

authorize the

judgments and decrees of the United States courts to be registered, recorded,
docketed, indexed, or otherwise conformed to the rules and requirements
70. By Act of August 23, 1916, c. 397, 39 STAT. 531 (1917). This was the
second attempt. By Act of August 17, 1912, c. 300, 37 STAT. 311 (1913) it
was provided that the third section of the Act of August 1, 1888 be repealed.
Apparently it was overlooked that this section had been amended and re-enacted
by Act of March 2, 1895, which was not mentioned. It would seem the attempted
repeal was, therefore, ineffective, but no case arose to present the issue before
it was conclusively disposed of in 1916. It would seem the question might well
have been considered in Seventeenth Street Land Co. v. Hustead, 263 Pa. 342,

106 At. 540 (1919), but the court disposed of the case without recognizing
the difficulty. In United States v. Kendall, 263 Fed. 126 (D. C. E. D. La. 1920),
the first attempt was apparently thought to be effective. The case is the only
one presenting an issue of the repealed third section. Holding that judgments
which prior to 1888 were not liens in the parish where rendered (in the court's
view, for failure to comply with the state recording requirements) became
potential liens by the enactment of the Act of 1888 and perfected liens simply
by the filing and docketing in the federal clerk's office, the court then found
that the repeal of the third section of that Act-thus permitting once more the
application of state recording laws to the judgments in the county or parish
of rendition-was the equivalent of the enactment of a new state recording
statute and not intended to apply to vested liens.
The authorities are not in accord on whether a new recording statute applies
to an existing lien. That the enactment of the Act of 1888 required compliance
with the state recording system to validate the lien of an existing federal
judgment, First Nat. Bank v. Clark, 55 Kan. 219, 40 Pac. 270 (1895); that it
did not, Rock Island Nat. Bank v. Thompson, 173 Ill. 593, 50 N. E. 1089 (1898);
Commercial Bank v. Eastern Banking Co., 51 Neb. 766, 71 N. W. 1024 (1897).
71. Even if the state lien law is not adopted by the Act of 1888 because
its conditions are not met, an adaptation of that law is adopted by the Conformity Act, as shown in the preceding section.
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relating to the judgments and decrees of the courts of the State." In the
light of the earlier decisions the purpose is plain. Because it had been
said that the federal government could not force state officers to record
federal judgments ;72 because such recording was necessary in fairness both
to third parties and to litigants in federal and state courts; because a
separate recording system for federal judgments would be cumbersome,
expensive, and not always understood by the laymen, Congress gave the
states an opportunity to require their officers to record the federal judgments. Indeed, it put pressure upon them to do so, for unless they imposed
such duties the federal liens would exist in the previous fashion, to the
hardship of the citizens of the state.
But it is not so plain what constitutes sufficient authorization or
delegation to these state officials. The law in Pennsylvania may be examined
for a concrete illustration of the problem.
The statute there provides that no state judgment shall be a lien upon
real estate unless indexed in a judgment index by the prothonotary of
the county where the land lies.73 The prothonotaries are authorized and
required to receive, index and enter transcripts of federal judgients on
the same basis as the state judgments. 4 But it is expressly provided
that nothing in the statutes should require the filing with the prothonotary
of a transcript of a federal judgment in the same county.75 Under the Act
of 1888 as originally enacted, there could be no question that a federal
judgment was a lien in the county of rendition upon proper indexing
by the federal clerk without filing a transcript with the state officer. After
the amendment of 1895, this was still unquestionably true if the federal
clerk maintained an office and complete records at all times within the
county. If he did not, the third section of the statute dropped out and
the case was governed entirely by the first two; essentially the same situation as has existed in all counties since 1916.76
7
In Seventeenth Street Land Co. v. Hustead,"
we are not told when the

72. During the Congressional debate on the bill which became the Act of
1888, it was asserted by Mr. Henderson of North Carolina, a committee member,
that the bill would have been drawn to require recording by the state officials
if the committee had considered that Congress had the power to make such an
order. 19 CoNG. Ruc. 2363 (1888).
73. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 17, § 1922.
74.

Ibid, § 1932.

77.

263 Pa. 342, 106 Atl. 540 (1919).

75. Ibid.
76. The former inclusion within the statute of an express provision preserving the judgment lien, which provision was inapplicable for lack of performance of an operative condition contained within it, perhaps created a stronger
negative inference against the lien than can be found where the statute is
silent on the matter altogether.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1941
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federal judgment in question was rendered. The court deemed that
irrelevant, but from the fact that the trial court's decree in the instant
controversy dated July, 1916, there is a fair probability that the federal
judgment was rendered before the third section was stricken from the
federal Act. The federal judgment in question had been rendered in
Pittsburgh, so there was every probability that the federal clerk maintained
an office and records in the county of rendition. Under the circumstances,
the decision that the judgment was a lien upon property in Allegheny
County, in which Pittsburgh is located, though no transcript had been
filed with the prothonotary of the common pleas court of that county,
was probably sound for reasons apart from the analysis of the opinion,
which proceeds upon a theory which, if sound, is applicable today.
In short, the court argued that it "was clearly within the power
of the state to enact" the exemption of federal judgments from the state
indexing system within the county of rendition; that this exemption in
no way conflicted with the federal statute (apparently speaking as of the
time of trial); and that the state law was adopted by Congress.
The trouble with this is that it was not within the power of the state
to grant or extend a federal judgment lien any more than it was within
its power to deny or restrict it. The fallacy derives from the emphasis
placed upon denials of the state's power to prejudice federal judgments.
The issue is not whether the state's statute purports to derogate or to
prefer the federal judgment. The question is, does it purport to affect it at
all? If so, it is invalid.
And Congress did not, by the Act of 1888 any more than by the
Process or Conformity Acts, attempt to delegate a power to the states to
regulate federal judgments, conditioned upon equal (or preferred) treatment with the state judgments. It couldn't if it wanted to. Nor did
Congress approach that condition by attempting to adopt, as federal law,
state statutes on federal judgments. The Act of 1888 is perfectly clear
on this point. It adopts as federal law the state law on state judgments.
What was the law of state judgment liens? "The lien of no judgment
on real estate in the same or another county . . . shall commence or be continued as against any purchaser or mortgagee, unless the
same be indexed in the county where the real estate is situated, in a book

to be called the judgment index.

.

."7

(italics mine)

It will not be overlooked that the state officer who is to record the
judgments is the prothonotary or clerk of the state court rendering the
78. Note 73, supra.
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judgment. It is his affirmative duty to enter the judgment of his court
on the judgment roll and index the same without further action (such as
filing a transcript) by the judgment creditor.79 In the ordinary course
of events the condition of the state judgment lien will, so far as the
creditor is concerned, be automatically satisfied. Then must the state
impose a similar affirmative duty upon the prothonotary to seek out the
federal judgments and docket them promptly without further action by
the creditor, if the operative condition of the Act of 1888 is to be satisfied ?
That Act says "authorize," which may not include the imposition of a
duty to seek out what is not brought to him. On the other hand, in Rhea
v. Smith, the court emphasized the important difference between automatic
liens and liens conditioned upon an additional step, no matter how simple,
which may be overlooked, neglected, or forgotten.
In deciding in Seventeenth Street Land Co. v. Hustead, that a federal
judgment was a lien in the county of rendition without docketing by the
state prothonotary the Pennsylvania Supreme Court unquestionably did
not mean to espouse the point just made. If the failure to impose an
affirmative duty on the state official to seek out and record the federal
judgments as he seeks and records the state judgments is not "authorization
to conform" the federal judgments to the docketing requirements of the
state law, then the adoptive provisions of the Act of 1888 don't apply at
all. The Process Act of 1872 controls and under it the courts held a federal
judgment a lien throughout the entire district without any state recording.
The problem is a grave one, for while very few states follow Pennsylvania in deliberately trying to prefer federal judgments, a considerable
number" condition the state judgment liens in the county of rendition upon
docketing by the clerk of the court rendering the judgment, the independent
duty of which clerk it is to enter the judgment as announced and to index
it. Some of these states would alleviate the unfairness of requiring a
transcript of the federal judgment to be filed with the state clerk by providing that the docketing by the federal clerk, in accordance with the duty
imposed upon him by the second section of the Act of 1888, would suffice
to create the federal lien in the county of rendition. 81 This would be a
more satisfactory and equitable situation, but the generous provision is
invalid, since the state can't stipulate when the federal judgment shall
be a lien, and Congress has adopted the law of state judgments. However,

79. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 17, §§ 1903, 1920, 1927, 1954.
80. Inter alia, Idaho, Indiana, Montana, Minnesota.
81. Inter alia, Minnesota.
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these invalid provisions furnish a clue to a possible solution. Of the
law of those states it can be fairly said that the primary intent and true
essence is that judgments of the state court shall be liens in the county of
rendition when docketed, not by a specific officer but by the clerk of the court
rendering the judgment. Hence a federal judgment is a lien throughout
the county of rendition when docketed by the clerk of the court rendering
the judgment; i.e., the federal clerk. That possibility is also present in
Pennsylvania, where we are directed not to construe the statute to require
docketing of the federal judgments with the state prothonotary in the
county of rendition. Can this direction, in Section 1932, be used as a
guide in construing Section 1922? The possibility is more remote where
the statute purports to require the docketing of the federal judgment
with the clerk of the state court in the county of rendition; that evinces a
pretty clear basic intention that the record shall be filed with a single
specified official.
No solution is satisfactory. To find that the Act of 1888 is not conditioned upon the states' imposing a mandate (which none have done) upon
state clerks of court to enter the federal judgments as announced and to
index the same is to impose upon the federal judgment creditors the hazard
of neglecting the filing-a hazard not encountered by the state judgment
creditor. To hold that the Act of 1888 cannot apply is to put a judgment
lien upon the entire district, perpetuating the admittedly unsatisfactory
situation which induced the Act of 1888. (And it is poor comfort to third
parties to answer that it is the fault of the state for enacting such a stupid
lien law.) To construe the state law as requiring only the docketing by
the clerk-be he federal or state-of the court rendering the judgment
creates difficulties with the federal lien. Either the docket may not be
kept in the county of rendition, 2 in which event there may be a lien
without a record in the county, or the statute must be considered to limit
the state lien to counties of rendition in which a record is kept,83 in which
case it is not possible to have a federal lien in certain counties (Congress
not authorizing the federal records to be maintained in every county where
court is held and the state lien law not authorizing the filing of state judgments in the county of rendition in any other way).
The first alternative seems the most reasonable interpretation of the
82. To illustrate: The Middle District of Pennsylvania is composed of
thirty-two counties. The federal district court sits in five cities, but the clerk
maintains offices only in two. 28 U. S. C. § 184 (1934).
83. This is expressly provided by statutes in Idaho. IDAHO CODE ANN.
(1932) § 7-1109.
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statute. Congress did require the federal clerks to enroll and index the
judgments, but it did not in any way condition the existence of a lien
on the performance of the clerk's duty, whether the lien arose under the
Act of 1888 or the Process Act. Throughout the statute Congress has
chosen to utilize the state recording machinery, rather than to establish
a federal system. It will be seen that the state statutes conditioning the
state liens upon docketing by the clerk in the county of rendition do not
make the test whether it is the duty of the clerk to enroll and docket the
judgment without reminder. If he fails to docket though obligated to do
so, there is no lien. If he dockets, but only at the insistent reminder of
the creditor, there is a lien. The performance of his duty is not an element
in the lien. If, then, it is less convenient for the federal judgment creditor
to record with the state clerk, if he cannot simply rely on the independent
obligation of the clerk to hear his judgment announced and enroll and
index it, that is but a result of Congressional policy to use state officials
whose other duties may benefit the state judgment creditors. That policy
makes a condition of equal recording facilities; it does not make a condition
of the extension to federal courts of other duties by the state officials, duties
such as Congress has required of federal clerks without relationship to
the federal lien. It is sufficient if the state clerks are "authorized" to
"conform" the judgments; they need not be commanded to duplicate all
the functions of the clerk of the federal court.
This is a very common type of lien statute, although the wording of
the various acts is seldom identical. In some states, statutes which appear
to make the state lien date from rendition have substantially the same
effect by virtue of the state law that a judgment is not "renaered" until
enrolled and indexed. The same point was potentially present in Re Jackson Light & Traction Co.,8 4 though not considered by the court.
B. DiscriminatoryRegulation of Federal Liens
Re Jackson Light & Traction Co. was a proceeding in bankruptcy in
which the petitioner claimed a preference under the lien of a judgment,
rendered in his favor against the bankrupt by the Federal District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi a year previously. This judgment
had been docketed by the federal clerk, but no transcript had ever been
filed with the clerk of the state circuit court. The property on which the

84.

269 Fed. 223 (C. C. A. 5th, 1920).
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lien was claimed was situated within the county where the judgment had
been rendered.
By the state law85 enrollment of state judgments by the clerk of the
circuit court where the property lay was a condition of lien, but that requirement being complied with, the lien took effect within the county of rendition
against the debtor and purchasers under him as of the time of rendition.
It further purported to require8 the filing of an abstract of federal judgments with the same official, and enrollment by him, after which they were
liens within the county from the time of enrollment. The petitioner argued
that this requirement was prejudicial to the federal judgments and void,
but the court ruled against him.
The decision is absolutely sound but the rationalization is faulty. The
court found an obvious legislative intent to provide a single repository
within each county for all notice of judgment liens, which repository was
the office of the clerk of the state court. Within this office notice of the
state judgments rendered in that county could be obtained at any time
The subsequent
after rendition by reference to the clerk's "minutes."
enrollment merely provided a convenient index of those judgments; enrollment was made a condition of the lien to bring pressure upon the parties
to insure this practical convenience, but it was not necessary for the
protection of the public that the lien be postponed until that enrollment.
In the case of federal judgments, it was not possible to obtain any notice
within that established repository until the abstract was filed. The discrimination was, therefore, not unreasonable and did not invalidate the
statute.
Inherent in this approach is a commonly held and fallacious presumption that the test of the validity of the state regulation of federal liens is
the comparative equality with the provisions for state judgment liens. It
is sometimes said that the regulations of federal liens must "conform"
to those of the state judgment liens. 7 Reading of the Act of 1888 should
disclose the inaccuracy of this premise. Nowhere does it validate state
regulation of federal judgments, be it discriminatory, equal or indulgent.
The only discretion allowed the state in the matter is in providing equal
facilities for recording or registering federal judgments. The only reference to "conformity" is in the requirement that state officials be authorized

85. Miss. CODE (1906) § 819, now Miss. CODE ANN. (1930) § 611.
86. MISS. CODE (1906) § 821, now Miss. CODE ANN. (1930) § 614.
87. Throughout this paper, this approach is designated the "conformity" theory.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol6/iss3/3
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to "conform" the federal judgments to the condition (of recording) of
state judgments. The states may, by providing inferior or no opportunities
for recording federal judgments, prevent the adoption by Congress of
the state recording requirement for state judgments. If equal facilities
are provided, through mandate to the state officers, state regulations become federal regulations, willy-nilly. The attempted state creation or
limitation of the federal judgment liens may simply be disregarded, except
that they may under some circumstances be regarded as requiring of the
state officer the reception and enrollment of tendered transcripts of federal
judgments (which may or may not, according to the particular law, be
equal to the recording procedure of state judgments).
It follows that there was no lien in Re Jackson Light & Traction Co.
because equal recording facilities for federal judgments had been provided,
the Federal Act of 1888 was in force, it adopted the state law of the liens
of state judgments, state judgments were not liens unless enrolled with the
state clerk of court, this judgment had not been enrolled, and the fact that
the place of record was the state clerk-of-court's office makes no difference
for reasons discussed in connection with Seventeenth Street Land Co. v.
85
Hustead.
But if the judgment had been enrolled by the state officer, the federal
lien would have dated back to the time of rendition, despite the contrary
state statute and despite the possible presence of a reason for discrimination.
The lien would be the same as the state judgment lien. An omnipotent
Congress decided there was no reason for distinguishing them.
Another form of state attempt to discriminate against federal judg9
ments was present in the famous case of Rhea v. Smith, the only decision
of the United States Supreme Court under the present federal statute.
If the provisions of the Act of 1888 and their inevitable application have
been reiterated ad nauseam, it is because it is necessary to have -them
firmly fixed in mind as one approaches the tortuous opinion in that case.
The facts were these. In 1921 a judgment (for costs) was rendered
against one Blanche Whitloek in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Missouri, then sitting at Joplin, in Jasper County.

88. Edwards, Federal Court Judgment Liens (1931) 6 WASH. L. REV. 49,
and Hackman, Concerning Rhea v. Smith (1929) 22 LAwYEr & BANKER 35, take
the opposite position, arguing that because there was a positive duty of enrollment
on the state clerks, the state lien was really effective from rendition. .,
89. 274 U. S. 434 (1927), noted (1926) 35 YALE L. J. 637 (state decision,
308 Mo. 422, 272 S. W. 964 (1925) ), (1926) 37 YALE L. T. 830, (1936), 1 Mo. L.
:REv. 96, (1927) 6 NEB. L. BuLL. 186, (1928) 7 N. C. L. RI.v. 103, (1932) 8 NoTRE
DAME LAWYER 96, (1928) 15 VA. L. REv. 86, (1928) 13 IowA L. REv. 203.
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This judgment was never recorded with any state officer. Blanche Whitlock
was then the owner of certain lands in Jasper County, which she subsequently conveyed for value to the defendant. Shortly thereafter execution
issued on the judgment, under which the property was sold to the plaintiff,
who brought this action of ejectment in the state courts. Both the trial
court and the state supreme court found the judgment not a lien because
not recorded with the clerk of the circuit court for Jasper County. The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The pertinent statutes of Missouri were these:
"Lien of judgment in supreme court, courts of appeals and federal
courts in this state.-Judgments and decrees obtained in the supreme court,
in any United States district or circuit court held within this state, in the
Kansas City court of appeals or the St. Louis court of appeals, shall, upon
the filing of transcript thereof in the office of the clerk of any circuit court,
be a lien on the real estate of the person against whom such judgment or
decree is rendered, situate in the county in which such transcript is filed. 0
"Lien in courts of record, generally.-Judgments and decrees rendered
by any court of record shall be a lien on the real estate of the person against
whom they are rendered, situate in the county for which the court is held."t
"The commencement, extent and duration of lien.-The lien of a
judgment or decree shall extend as well to the real estate acquired after
the rendition thereof as to that which was owned when the judgment
or decree was rendered. Such liens shall commence on the day of the
rendition of the judgment, and shall continue for three years, subject to be
revived as hereinafter provided; but when two or more judgments or
decrees are rendered at the same term, as between the parties entitled
to such judgments or decrees, the lien shall commence on the last day of
the term at which they are rendered."°2
At the outset, the court was confronted with a true problem of
statutory construction. It was impossible to decide the case until the court
found which of the several Missouri lien statutes on state judgments, let
alone federal judgments, was by the Act of 1888 adopted or compared.
The state courts had said, 93 the lien statutes on judgments of the state
appellate courts, for they are analagous to the federal courts in embracing
several counties within their jurisdiction, and the purpose of these statutes

90.

91.
92.

Mo. REv.
Mo. REv.

STAT.

(1919) § 1554.

STAT. (1919) § 1555.
Mo. REv. STAT. (1919) § 1556.

93. Rhea v. Smith, 308 Mo. 422. 272 S. W. 964 (1925).
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is to provide a record in each county. The United States Supreme Court
said, the statute applicable to the "court of first instance of general jurisdiction," for that is the essential character of the federal district court.
The conclusion seems eminently sound. It is substantiated by the history
of the Process Acts9" and the common sense reason that trial court judgment liens are, in the whole, the important ones to the public. While, as
was argued in Re Jackson Light & Traction Co., there may be a reason for
additional recording of the federal judgments, and while on this issue it
begs the question to answer that Congress decided otherwise in adopting
the state law on state primary courts of general jurisdiction, the decision
that Congress did so intend is not unreasonable.
With this premise established, the reader will not be surprised to learn
that the Supreme Court held the judgment to have been a lien on the land
in Jasper County. A full and sufficient reason would have been that a
judgment of the state circuit court sitting in Jasper County would have
been a lien from rendition, without further enrollment. This was adopted
as the law for federal judgment liens by the Act of 1888. The precise
holding of the case cannot be attacked.
But the rationalization caused confusion and concern. The court
proceeded:
(1) Prior to the Act of 1888 the judgments of federal courts were
liens throughout the territorial jurisdiction of the court whenever the judgments of the state courts were liens throughout their counties. This resulted
from the adoption by the Process Act of the final process of the state
courts, adapted to the increased territorial jurisdiction of the federal
courts by the technique of Massingill v. Downs.
(2) The Act of August 1, 1888, expressly adapting the lien law of the
several states and inferentially their recording requirements did so only
conditionally. The act limited the rule of Massingill.v. Downs95 "only in
those States which passed laws making the conditions of creation, scope
and territorial application of the liens of federal court judgments the
same as state court judgments."
(3) The question is one of "great nicety" and mere "approximate
conformity" will not suffice. There is danger that the agent or attorney

94. Already discussed in connection with Shrew v. Jones, 22 Fed. Cas. No.

12,818 (C.

C. D. Ind. 1840).

95. The court is reported to have said, "Massingill v. Jones." The unimportant misstatement or typographical error graphically illustrates the fusion
of Shrew v. Jones and Massingill v. Downs into a well defined doctrine.
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of the federal judgment creditor may forget to file his transcript with the
state officer in M/issouri. The Missouri law did not "secure the needed
conformity in the creation, extent and operation of the resulting liens."
"It is the inequality which permits a lien instantly to attach to the rendition
of the judgment, without more, in the state court which does not so attach
in the federal court in that same county that prevents compliance with the
requirement of section one of the Act of 1888."
(4) The condition of the Act of 1888 not being satisfied, the case
comes under the Process Act of 1872 and the doctrine of Massingill v.
Downs. "The lien of federal court judgments in Missouri therefore attaches to all lands of the judgment debtor lying in the counties within
the respective jurisdictions of the two federal district courts in that state."
(5) Re Jackson Light & Traction Co. "may well be distinguished
from this one because necessity of enrollment was exacted as to every
court. "
The vulnerable paragraph is the second. There is no room for
quibbling or argument. The court was simply wrong in its statement
of the Congressional Act of 1888. Because that was wrong, the whole
approach and technique is wrong. The Act contains not one word conditioning its application upon a state statute providing equally for "the
creation, scope or territorial application" of federal judgment liens. That
would be no more than a conditional delegation of power to the state legislature to regulate the power of federal courts over the litigants before them,
impossible and not attempted. The Act did say that it did not adopt state
lien law which required of state court judgments recording or indexing with
or by state officers unless those same officers were by state statute authorized
to register, record, docket, or index federal judgments in conformity with
the rules for the state judgments. That is, the issue is purely one of providing equal recording facilities; if that is not done by the states, the Act of
1888 is indeed inoperative and the federal judgment liens depend upon
the Act of 1872. Of course, that Act, too, purports to adopt state law, tut
it would be vain to contend now that the judgment lien is not under it at
least district-wide.
Did the law of Mlissouri "authorize the judgments and decrees of the
United States courts to be registered, recorded, docketed, indexed or otherwise conformed to the rules and requirements relating to the judgments

96. The error of the court's rationalization on this point is very clearly
demonstrated by Edwards, FederalCourt Judgment Liens (1931) 6 WASH. L. R-v.
49.
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and decrees of the courts of the.State?" It certainly did. Of course, it
authorized recording which wasn't necessary; it vainly purported to require
unnecessary recording; but that doesn't obscure the essential fact that it
did authorize recording of federal judgments whenever and in the manner
required of state judgments. The greater includes the less. The invalid
assertion of authority must be disregarded, but the mandate to the officer
to record when the transcript is filed remains unaffected. The unrecorded
judgment was not a lien in other counties, any more than an unrecorded
state judgment would have been.9 7
The decisions in both Re Jackson Light & Traction Co. and Rhea v.
Smith were right, but they cannot be reconciled on the "interpretation"
of the Act of 1888 employed in the latter case. If the matter is one "of
great nicety" for which "approximate conformity won't do" (the circuit
court of appeals thought in the former case that substantial equality, with
no arbitrary distinctions, was enough), then it becomes a play upon words
in an arbitrary test of conformity to say that the Mississippi statute was
adopted because it made "the conditions of creation" equal, when it
differentiated the time of effectiveness. 9
C. The Nature of the State Lien Law Adopted
While Chief Justice Taft, speaking for an undivided court, adopted
the rationalization just outlined, a different interpretation of the decision
in Rhea v. Smith is possible, and though apparently not enunciated, it
seems to underlie some expressions of opinion on the scope of federal

97. Accord: Rathbone Co. v. Kimball, 117 Neb. 229, 220 N. W. 244 (1928),
cert. denied, 278 U. S. 655 (1929). The denial of certiorari proves little but is

much to be regretted, for the case offered a perfect opportunity for the Supreme

Court to have clarified the disconcerting dictum of Rhea v. Smith. Under a
statute which, if anything, discriminated against federal judgments more violently than the Missouri law, the Nebraska court held the unrecorded federal

judgment not a lien in counties other than that in which it was rendered. There
being equal recording facilities, the attempted state limitation of federal judgment liens was simply ineffective.
98. It has been argued that no distinction could be made between the two
cases because in both, in effect, the state lien in the county of r~ndition dated
from rendition. See note 88, supra. The contention confuses two distinct elements in the problem. Whether or not the state officers were required, of their
own initiative, to perform the essential recording is a pertinent consideration on
the question of whether the state really provides equal recording facilities for
federal judgments. Howsoever that question is answered, the fact remains
that the record was a condition of the state lien. If the state officers were
derelict, there was no lien. But the Missouri statute made the judgment a lien
from rendition, and enrollment is not an element of rendition in that state.
Hence, in Mississippi the unrecorded federal judgment was either no lien at all,
or a lien throughout the district. In Missouri, the unrecorded federal judgment
was a lien in the county of rendition. Despite the dictum -to the contrary, there
appears no reason for thinking it a lien elsewhere.
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judgment liens in given states. 99 It adopts the decision and the dictum of
Rhea v. Smith, that a federal judgment was in 1921 a lien throughout the
federal district in Missouri. Starting with the proposition that the Act
of 1888 adopts for federal courts the lien law of the state for state courts,
and conceding that the character of state attempts to regulate federal
liens is irrelevant except as it fails to provide recording facilities equal
to those for state judgments, the question is simply, what is the state law
as to comparable state courts? In answering the question these lawyers
take a familiar but, I believe, an altogether unjustified position. They say
a judgment of a circuit court in Missouri was a lien throughout the entire
jurisdiction of the court immediately upon rendition. Emphasis is placed
upon the words of Section 1555, "the county for which the court is held."
It follows that the judgment of the federal district court was upon rendition
a lien throughout .the territorial jurisdiction of that court, and of course,
the county in which ("for which") it was rendered.
As its advocates admit, this view results in serious inconvenience and
occasional hardship in every state in which the state judgment is a lien
throughout its jurisdiction without further enrollment. 100 The concept is
drawn from the decisions prior to 1888, and it is submitted that it was
just such interpretation of the Process Acts that Congress meant to render
unnecessary by the Act of that year.10 The doctrine of Shrew v. Jones and
Massingill v. Downs is hard to justify on principle. It represents a judicial
determination that the federal courts should not be less powerful than
their state rivals, despite Congressional apathy-or, perhaps, despite Congressional intent-and was necessitated by inability to assure registration
by state officers where that would seem to be required. The plain import

99. The following interpretation of the Act of 1888 is adopted by many
title examiners in Missouri, who in a very direct sense have had to wrestle with
the implications of Rhea v. Smith, not only under the Missouri statutes then
before the court but also under the subsequent amendment. And see Note (1936)
1 Mo. L. REv. 96.
100. See Hall, Work of Wisconsin Legislature (Creditors' Rights) (1936) 11
Wis. L. REv. 142.
101. The Congressional debate on the Act of 1888 shows very plainly that the
condition existing under the doctrine of "Massingill v. Jones" was highly unsatisfactory and that the prime purpose of the bill was to remove the necessity
of searching the federal district court records, wherever kept, for liens on land
anywhere within the district. The very argument here made-that the state
judgment is a lien throughout the jurisdiction of the court rendering it-was
there considered, it being the opinion of Mr. Warner of Missouri that the bill as
introduced by the committee perpetuated the undesirable condition in adopting
that state lien law. Certain amendments were made to meet, so far as was possible, that objection, and the bill was passed upon the assurance of the committee
that it embodied the best possible language to preserve conformity and to avoid
the interpretationfeared by Mr. Warner. 19 CONG. REC. 2359 et seq. (50th Congress, 1st sess. 1888).
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of the later statute was to destroy the doctrine whenever its basis of
necessity was removed; i.e., whenever the state assumed the same burden
of recording federal judgments it did for state judgments. Whether even
now the federal government could regulate the state officers in the performance of their duty or punish them for dereliction need not be considered; Congress did not condition its statute upon that power.
This is indeed an artificial construction of the state law said to be
adopted. What was said above in regard to the doctrine of Massingill v.
Downs is applicable here. The doctrine misreads the intention of the state
statutes, supplanting plain geographical terminology (deliberately used
to provide recording of judgment liens within the recording units created
for every other lien or property interest) with jurisdictional concepts, and
disregards the authoritative state court's interpretation of the statute of its
own legislature. It is premised upon the illusion that there are well defined
territorial limits to the jurisdiction of the state and federal trial courts
of record coinciding exactly with county and district respectively, whereas,
in most state and in all federal courts, both original and final process run
throughout the state, 0 2 and whereas in perhaps the majority of states the
circuits or districts embrace several counties and the designation of the
court when sitting in a certain county as "the circuit (or district) court
for X county" is largely a matter of venue and of organization for administrative purposes. It purports to rationalize both the holding and the
dictum of Rhea v. Smith, but in fact is quite opposed to the reasoning of that
case, which nowhere intimates that a federal judgment must upon rendition
be a lien throughout the district simply because a state judgment is a lien
throughout the county of rendition without recording. It is wasteful of
time and energy, forcing a search of federal court records wherever they
are kept within the district (or state) in regard to every real estate transaction. It is seldom suspected or understood by laymen, who reasonably
suppose complete records of title can be found in each county, and who,
reasonably or otherwise, are prone to suppose the state statute is binding,
on both counts being disastrously lulled into a false sense of security.1 3

102. In the federal courts, by virtue of REv. STAT. § 985 (1875), 28 U. S. C.
§ 838 (1934), as to final process, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 f., as to
original process. It might well be queried, what is the effect of this new rule
on the old controversy of Manhattan Company v. Evertson (see text, supra, and
notes 37 and 41) in cases where the Act of 1888 does not apply.
103. The result of the operation of the doctrine of Massingill v. Downs,
embodying the same concept, is well described by Judge Caldwell in Dartmouth
Savings Bank v. Bates, 44 Fed. 546, 549 (C. C. D. Kan. 1890), one of the first

cases to consider the Act of 1888.
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Most proponents of the doctrine argue that these practical objections
are not a necessary consequence, that they can be avoided by a requirement
of recording state judgments in the county of rendition. But, once
adopted at all, there is no logical reason why the terminology of "county"
should not be transformed into "jurisdiction" after recording, also. Immediately after recording within the county of rendition, the state judgment is "a lien throughout the jurisdiction of the court." So applied,
it would obviously defeat the Act of 1888; not less truly does it contravene
the statute in its more limited scope. However, in a very recent case' 01 a
federal district court held that a federal judgment rendered in Kansas
City gave no lien even upon property in that city until it was recorded
with the "clerk of the circuit court for civil causes," a condition of the
lien of Missouri state court judgments in cities of over 100,000 population.
D. A Proposed Model Statute
A number of states' 0 ' condition the lien of state court judgments,
even in the county of rendition, upon recording with a county officer
unconnected with the state court of primary jurisdiction. The Missouri
statute involved in In re B. P. Lientz Mfg. Oo.,10° is partly of this type,
for there are a number of divisions of the circuit court in the large Missouri
cities, and that decision furnishes a guide for the safest possible statute.
1. The recorder of every county within this state is hereby authorized
to receive duly authenticated transcripts of all judgments and decrees
rendered by courts of record of this state, and by courts of the United States
held within this state. It shall be his duty to note upon such transcripts
the exact time and date when they were received, and to enter them
promptly and uniformly in a judgment book, to be kept for that purpose.
re shall also maintain an index to the judgment book, and shall index
"This rule resulted in giving suitors in the federal courts a preference over
those in the state courts as to the territorial extent of the lien, and worked a

hardship on the citizens generally.

The mass of people relied confidently on

the records in the clerk's office of their county disclosing all judgments that were

liens on property in the county. Most people were ignorant of the all-pervading

lien of a judgment in a federal court, and they bought and sold lands on the

faith of what the county records disclosed. The result was that cases of great
hardship occurred.

Persons who bought and paid for lands on the faith that

records in the county clerk's office showed the condition of the land with reference
to judgment liens thereon, afterwards lose their land by reason of the liens of

judgments in federal courts held in some other county, and often at a distance

of hundreds of miles from the county in which the lands lay."
104. In re B. P. Lientz Mfg. Co., 32 F. Supp. 233 (W. D. Mo. 1940), noted
(1941) 6 Mo. L. REv. 214.
105. Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Louisiana, New
Mexico, New York, Oregon, Texas, and West Virginia.
106. 32 F. Supp. 233 (W. D. Mo. 1940).
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the judgments by the names of every judgment debtor, alphabetized to
the first letter of his family name.
2. Judgments and decrees of courts of record of this state, and of
courts of the United States rendered within this state, shall be liens upon
real estate situated in any county of this state in which a transcript thereof
has been filed with the recorder of that county, as above provided. The
lien shall be effective from the time the transcript is filed with the recorder.
3. Any bona fide purchaser for value of real estate subject to the lien
of a judgment of the courts of this state or of the United States may maintain an action against the recorder of any county for damages suffered
because of the delay of said recorder in entering and indexing said
judgment.
Several points of this proposed statute deserve discussion. In the first
place, the clause of section two which reads, "and of courts of the United
States rendered within this state," is superfluous, since states can't regulate
federal judgment liens and since the Act of 1888 would operate completely
on the clause relative to the state judgments. Nevertheless, it does no
harm, and as long as courts talk about "conformity in the creation, extent
and operation of the resulting liens upon land as between federal and
state court judgments," it is silly to take the risk of an adverse decision.
In the second place, the statute requires recording within the county
of rendition. An argument can be made in favor- of a lien in that county
immediately upon rendition, since, so far as the state courts are concerned,
there will be a record of it within the county. But even so to those courts,
the record -will not be with the other records of title, may be overlooked
by laymen, and will cause inconvenience to others. Rhea v. Smith squarely
and properly held that you can't have a state judgment lien within the
county from rendition and still require recording of a federal judgment
rendered within the county. Since federal court records are not kept in
every county in which federal judgments are rendered, if you do not
require recording of state judgments in the county of rendition, you will
have federal liens of which there is no record in the county. Recording
within the county of rendition also serves to make more plain the essential
illogic of the "lien throughout the jurisdiction" argument and is supported
07
by the decision in the Lientz case.1

107.

It is also squarely supported by the decision of Niemi Bros., Inc. v.

Rosenbluh, 147 Misc. 159, 263 N. Y. Supp. 445 (Mun. Ct. N. Y. 1933).

The

case is of inconclusive authority, however, not only because rendered by a court

of inferior jurisdiction, but also because of lack of discussion of the problem.
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The county recorder was designated instead of the clerk of the state
court to avoid the argument already considered in connection with
Seventeenth Street Land Co. v. Hustead. Although it requires some little
extra trouble on the part of state judgment creditors, it saves a corresponding amount of trouble for title searchers.
Local policy and conditions must affect the form of the statute in any
event, but questions of the duration of the lien and methods of revival
are so apart from the recording issue that no mention was made of them.
For various adaptations of the form here recommended, consider the
statutes of Alabama, Arizona, or New York.
It would possibly be more productive of result to suggest modification
of the Act of 1888. That involves changing one statute instead of many.
The only possibility of a more successful act lies in the suggestion previously
made that Congress might require state officers to record federal judgments.
No problem of "conformity" or of "equal recording facilities" could
arise. On the other hand, that is a debatable question and the dicta in the
cases discussed might be considered judicial authority against the validity
of such action. In any event, it is perhaps more politic to let the state
superintend and discipline its own officers, and not confuse them with a
double allegiance. Re-examination of the problem by the Supreme Court
should eliminate much of the uncertainty without any statutory changes,
state or federal.
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